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NEGOTIATING WITH SCHOOL TEACHERS:
ANATOMY OF A MUDDLE
JOHN H. LEDDY*
Philadelphia is a funny city. It doesn't try to be. It just is. W. C.
Fields said he spent a week in Philadelphia in one night. Fred Allen said
they held a contest; first prize was one week in Philadelphia; second
prize was two weeks in Philadelphia. Last year Philadelphia hired a public
relations firm to encourage people to visit the city. The best slogan they
could come up with was: "Philadelphia Isn't As Bad as Philadelphians Say
It Is." People stayed away by the thousands. Philadelphia was supposed
to have a Bicentennial Celebration in 1976. It was to be an international
world's fair costing at least $200 million. By the time Philadelphia got
through fussing about where it would be held and how it would be
done, it was lost completely. Now we're going to celebrate the bicen-
tennial by having three Boy Scouts light up sparklers and sing "God Bless
America" in front of Independence Hall. And, of course, all of the Phil-
adelphia sports teams are so bad as to be virtually unmentionable in mixed
company.
It was almost inevitable, therefore, that when Philadelphia got in-
volved in negotiating with school teachers it would end up in a mess. And
so it has. Let me trace the saga of the 1972 school negotiations in Phila-
delphia. I do this not in criticism of any of the individuals involved, but
because I think those negotiations illustrate a great number of the problems
and pitfalls involved in all school negotiations and will set a framework
for our discussion. Fortunately, I was not involved in this debacle and so
can view it with an objective, though somewhat jaundiced, eye.
The Philadelphia school system embraces 280 schools, 13,000 teachers
and 285,000 pupils. The projected cost of running the schools for the
1972-73 school year is $373 million. Projected revenues for the year
from local taxes are $110 million. State subsidies will produce $205
million and the federal government's contribution to the general fund is
projected at six million. The school board, therefore, entered into nego-
tiations ten months ago faced with a projected $52 million deficit, even
if there were no changes in the negotiated contract. Dire predictions
were made that the schools would run out of money and would close in
March of 1973. If this were to occur, the state would withhold some of
its payments, which are based on pupil attendance, and the deficit would in-
crease to $68 million for the following year. The banks stated that they
would not loan the school board money to meet its payroll pending receipt
of the state funds and tax revenues, as they had done in prior years, unless
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the school board presented a balanced budget. Under the circumstances,
this was impossible for the school board to do. In order to reduce
this deficit, the school board sent its negotiators to the table with proposals
which would provide for: no salary increases other than the $600 longevity
increments already built into the salary schedule; lengthening the teach-
ing time in the high schools by 40 minutes (from four hours and five min-
utes); reduction of 385 teaching posts and approximately 200 non-teaching
positions; and the imposition of non-teaching duties on junior and senior
high school teachers, such as hall and lunchroom duty.
The negotiators for the teachers came to the table with 434 demands
having a dollar value estimated at $600 million. Included among these
were demands for a 34 percent salary increase, which would have raised
the starting teacher salary from $8,900 to $12,000, a reduction of class
size to 25 pupils, additional preparation time for elementary school teachers
(which would have required hiring 1,200 additional teachers), deletion of
non-teaching duties for junior high school teachers (from 18 minutes per
day), and an increase in the board's contribution to health and welfare
benefits from $110 per teacher per year to $700 per year.
On this high note negotiations were begun in January 1972. They
stumbled on to a deadline of September 5th with little progress, and on Sep-
tember 5th, which was supposed to be the first day of school, the teachers
went on strike. After three weeks of strike, the union dropped 150 of its
demands, retaining a mere 284, and the school board offered increases of
$330 to the teachers who were at the maximums of their salary levels. In
return, the school board continued its demands for a longer school day and
reduced staffs.
The mothers marched on City Hall, the students marched on City Hall,
the football players and coaches marched on City Hall. Mayor Rizzo got
into the act, Governor Schapp got into the act, the City Council got into
the act, the newspapers got into the act and they all huffed and they puffed
and nothing happened. On September 25th Community Legal Services
and a lawyer named Joseph Fineman got into the act by filing suits in com-
mon pleas court to enjoin the strike. The suits sought to require the teach-
ers to go back to work and continue negotiating, and to require the Phila-
delphia City Council to enact legislation providing sufficient taxing
authority for the school district so that it could both meet its deficit and run
the school system. This latter idea got the Mayor's attention, since he had
been eleced on a pledge of no increased taxes. Thus he came charging
back into the arena.
On the evening of September 26th, following all day meetings in the
judge's chambers, it appeared a settlement would be reached, but it blew up
over a $2 million item. The Mayor denounced the teachers' demands as
selfish and unreasonable and said that an amateur like himself should stay
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out of such things. Twenty-four hours later he ignored his own good ad-
vice, as he and the judge prodded the parties into a temporary solution of
their problems. Under the settlement reached, the teachers returned to
school under their old salary schedule, the school day was not increased
and the cuts in staff were restored. The lost school days will be made
up by cancelling the Christmas and Easter vacation periods. The teachers
will suffer no salary loss from their strike because they will be paid for
working on the former vacation days. Negotiations will continue until
December 31, when the teachers can again go on strike, if they choose
to do so. The expected deficit is still $52 million. Several bills have been
proposed to the state legislature to produce additional funds, but they have
been defeated. As of today, no significant progress has been reported in
the negotiations, and the Philadelphia newspapers have published editorials
expressing the opinion that Public Law 195, giving teachers and other pub-
lic employees the right to strike, might not have been such a hot idea after
all.
Why have I recited this black comedy called "The Philadelphia Story"
for you? I think that the Philadelphia experience is not atypical from the
experiences which I and others have had in representing school boards at
the bargaining table. Negotiations with school teachers contain many of
the elements which are present in any labor negotiation, but also many
which are frustratingly different. Negotiating with teachers is somewhat
like kissing a cow-you may or may not like it, but you've got to admit that
it's different. Some experienced negotiators have tried it and said "never
again." I happen to enjoy the additional problems posed in school negoti-
ations. Perhaps I am a masochist.
In my discussion I will not recite the various state statutes regulating
bargaining with teachers. I am sure you can all read your own state's stat-
utes and interpret them better than I can. Those from Ohio, of course,
have no problem in this area, since the Ohio legislature, in its infinite wis-
dom, has not seen fit to pass any legislation authorizing or regulating nego-
tiations between public employers and their employees. So negotiations
with school teachers in Ohio continue on the "catch-as-catch-can" basis.
I am also not going to delve into the philosophial questions involved in
negotiating with school teachers. Rather, I will attempt to delineate what
I see as the basic differences between negotiating in the private sector and
negotiating with school teachers, explore some of the issues which are
unique in school negotiations, and suggest some techniques which I have
found helpful in those negotiations.
The primary factor which distinguishes school negotiations from private
industrial negotiations is the complexity of the relationship of the interests
involved. Industrial negotiations are arithmetic, one-on-one, labor versus
management. School negotiations are geometric.
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The employer is the school board, a group of elected or appointed of-
ficials from extremely diverse backgrounds, none of which may have pre-
pared them to deal with negotiating collective bargaining agreements or,
in fact, to deal with either the questions of educational philosophy with
which they must grapple or the proper expenditure of public funds running
into the hundreds of millions of dollars annually. Regardless of the size
of the school system, school boards tend to be paternalistic and autocratic.
They come from a tradition, stretching back into antiquity, in which the
school board had virtual life-and-death control over administrators and
teachers and their respective careers. In order to find an analogous situa-
tion in industry it is necessary to go back to pre-1935, prior to the passage
of the National Labor Relations Act. Just as the transition from "the boss
is God" was difficult for industry when the rights of collective bargaining
were enforced in the early years under the NLRA, the transition is equally
difficult in the public sector today. While school boards may intellectually
accept the requirement that they bargain with their teachers, they have great
difficulty accepting it emotionally. They still believe, and I am sure sin-
cerely, that they know what is best for their school system, and that these
young teachers with their demands for big salaries and a voice in the man-
agement of the schools must be kept in their place. In addition to resenting
the presumptiveness of the teachers in asserting rights at the bargaining
table and daring to threaten to strike, the board also is somewhat suspicious
of the motives of its own superintendent and administrators. After all,
these people are only glorified teachers who keep coming up with half-
baked educational ideas that cost too much money. There is always the sus-
picion that the administrators have a tendency to be too easy on the teach-
ers and to "side" with them when the going gets tough in order to make
their own jobs easier.
As far as the administrators are concerned, they seem to be constantly
confused by the balance between pleasing the board, accomplished by keep-
ing costs down and staff discipline firm, and securing the cooperation of
their teachers in advancing their concept of a proper educational program
for the students. Basically all administrators are teachers at heart and
they get very confused with respect to what their role should be in relation to
the teachers, particularly when collective bargaining rears its vexing head.
This confusion borders on schizophrenia at the level of the school principals.
These poor devils are the line foremen of the school business and they
really don't know where their loyalties lie, or where there personal interests
are best served. They are told that they are "members of the management
team," and yet they are rarely consulted on any major decisions affecting
the operation of the school system. Such decisions come from the board via
the superintendent. Traditionally, the salaries of principals have been
pegged to the teachers' salary schedule. They get the maximum for a
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teacher with a Master's Degree plus an additional percentage or dollar
amount, and their fringe benefits are the same as the teachers'. Obviously,
under such a system, if the teachers are successful in negotiating substantial
pay raises and improved fringe benefits for themselves, the principal will
also prosper. The principal's pocketbook, therefore, will tend to ally him
with the teachers' bargaining demands. However, where the teachers' de-
mands touch his authority to run his school the way he wants, he be-
comes quite incensed and demands that the negotiators strike down such
impudence with an iron fist. For, you see, the principal has also traditionally
been a paternalistic autocrat with tremendous power over his staff and their
careers. For years he dictated hair styles, mode of dress, and the conduct
and morality of his staff and his authority was rarely challenged.
At the superintendent level this dichotomy does not exist. The su-
perintendent knows which side he is on: he is the school board's chief
administrator. Yet he, too, is constantly frustrated by that group of
non-professionals (in the educational sense) trying to tell him how he
should run his school system. While he may be an absolute monarch to his
staff, he must always answer to the housewives, undertakers and butchers
on the school board because they sign his paycheck. When he gets thrust
into a collective bargaining situation, he must constantly exercise care that
the negotiated contract does not reflect both too much of his thinking as to
what is proper for the school district and too little of what the school
board thinks is proper.
This is also true for the chief negotiator. Brought in as an outsider, he
is paid by the board, but he works most closely with the superintendent and
the latter's administrators. He must negotiate a contract which not only
will conform to the dollar limitations established by the board but also
will procedurally allow the superintendent to run an efficient school system.
Complicating his role, however, is the fact that school board members,
unlike directors of most large corporations, tend to try to involve them-
selves in the day-to-day operation of the school system, thereby infringing
on the area of administration. They also tend to have their own highly
individualistic theories as to what is proper in education and what the
teachers in their school system may do and shall get. Woe unto the nego-
tiator who makes what appears to be an innocuous concession at the bar-
gaining table, only to find later that, although it is satisfactory from the
standpoint of the administrators, he has sacrificed a principle, minute as it
might be, long held dear by a board member.
It is, in short, very difficult for the negotiator to determine the wishes of
the board members (since there is rarely unanimity on every issue among
the members) and to choose between the desires of the administrators and
those of the board when they do not coincide. He often finds himself at
the bargaining table with too few or conflicting directions on a particular
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issue. As you can imagine, this adds an additional flavor of mystery and
adventure to the negotiating process. This interaction of personalities on the
management side is one of the factors which will either attract you to school
board representation or send you screaming from it.
On the other side of the table are the teachers. While in large cities
they may be represented by an attorney or other professional negotiator, too
often they are not. More than likely you will be faced with a committee of
terribly earnest young teachers spouting a strange jargon, who have gone
through a seminar on negotiating conducted by the National Education As-
sociation (hereinafter NEA) or the American Federation of Teachers (here-
inafter AFT), and who approach negotiating a contract with all the fervor
and dedication of a religious crusade. They come with their formalized
procedures calling for written agendas of meetings, exchanges of letters
naming bargaining team members, canned NEA or AFT lists of demands,
and the firm belief that all of their demands are of equal importance and
must be met as written. This approach, as you may well imagine, makes
for rather sticky negotiating. Firm in their conviction that they are the only
ones who know how their school system should be run, compromise is not in
them. All issues must be talked to death, not once but many times, since
it is their firm expectation that you will eventually see the wisdom of their
position and acquiesce in it. In short, you are not dealing with a grizzled
old official of the Machinists or Teamsters who is schooled in the art of the
possible, knows how hard and far to push, and knows when to let go.
Your role as negotiator, therefore, also involves an educational aspect. You
must not only educate your own people in the requirements and procedures
of bargaining, but you must also, as subtly as possible, educate the other
side's negotiators in the performance of their roles.
In the background, but very much a factor in the negotiations, are the
invisible but often vocal other parties in interest - the taxpayers, the stu-
dents, and the minority groups. They are not directly represented at the
bargaining table, yet their interests are very directly affected by the re-
sults of the negotiations. Clearly, if a contract is negotiated which requires
the expenditure of great amounts of additional funds, the taxpayers will
be called upon to provide those funds. Many of the items concerning
staffing and instructional policy will directly affect the students. To
the extent that teacher aides or teaching specialists are increased or de-
creased, the education of the underprivileged minority groups will be en-
riched or depleted.
I am not suggesting that these groups should be directly represented at
the bargaining table, since additional voices would only further complicate
an already difficult bargaining process; but I do have some concern as to
who really represents the interests of these groups in the bargaining. Both
sides, of course, profess to have as their paramount goal "quality education
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for the boys and girls," but each defines the means by which it is to be
achieved in their school system in drastically different terms. When the
two sides have finally hammered out an agreement, it must be one which the
taxpayers will support and which will, in fact, provide a higher level of
education for all of the students of the system, or the bargaining process
will have failed. Of course, no such concern for third parties exists in
private negotiating. Industry does not have to seek the approval of tax-
payers to fund its agreements, and it does not have to concern itself with
the future abilities of a group of children to cope with society and its de-
mands.
In the area of finance the public negotiator is in an entirely different
ballgame than the private negotiator. When a corporation bargains with
its employees, it attempts to set financial limits which will hopefully allow it
to get a contract agreement and beyond which it will not yield without a
strike. It carefully calculates the cost of a strike, assesses alternative meth-
ods of supplying its product to its customers and reviews its production and
pricing systems to determine how it can recoup the cost of its settlement.
The last thing in the world which it wishes to profess is inability to pay,
since that horrendous concept will require it to open its books to the
union and disclose its most closely protected corporate fiscal secrets.
In negotiating for a public employer, the entire negotiation is conducted
on the basis of ability or inability to pay. The sources of revenue to a
school board are public knowledge and the amounts available can be cal-
culated by both sides. There is no product whose price can be raised or
which can be produced in greater volume to increase revenue. There are
no stockholders for whom funds have to be withheld, and no profit-sharing
or stock bonuses which have to be funded to attract and compensate exec-
utives. No one can make off with any of the money or spend it on fast
blondes and slow horses. It is all accountable. But it is a limited amount.
Given this established, limited amount of funds the school board and its
superintendent must fashion a budget which, in their opinions, buys the
best educational program for the dollars available. Since 85 to 90 percent
of the school operating budget is spent for personnel, there is not a great
amount of money available for the other needs of the school system. If
the sides once agree on the total amount of money which is available, and
sometimes such agreement is difficult to achieve, then they are really en-
gaged in a discussion of "ordering priorities." This is educational jargon
which translates into "Why are you spending money for building mainte-
nance when you could be giving it to us in salary increases ?"
One of the great difficulties in school bargaining is the fact that the
school board and superintendent unilaterally establish the budget, some-
times at the same time as, or prior to, their negotiations with their teachers.
Both sides come to the table, therefore, faced with a budget which has al-
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ready designated an amount for staff salaries and related personnel ex-
penditures. Bargaining by the teachers then can take the form of:
A. Slicing up the pie established by the board into salary increases, fringe
benefits and other personnel costs; or
B. Throwing the pie away and demanding that the board provide a
larger pie to slice.
Because of an inherent distrust of a budget-making procedure in which they
are not involved, the teachers normally tend to follow plan B. They de-
mand that money be taken from other areas of the budget and be used for
salary increases-the "reordering of priorities" approach, or they demand
that the board come up with more money than the budget states the board
has access to. If the latter approach is followed to a successful conclusion,
the board, as in Philadelphia, will be faced with a budget deficit. Faced
with such a deficit, the board has three alternatives, all of which are equally
unpalatable:
A. Closing the schools early;
B. Increasing local property taxes; or
C. Praying for a handout from the state or federal government.
The disadvantages of plan A are obvious. Not only are the students
deprived of educational days, but the school board's financial problem will
be further aggravated by the loss of state foundation revenue due to the
lesser number of pupil days. Increasing local property taxes is extremely
unpopular with local taxpayers, particularly if the taxpayers, rightly
or wrongly, feel their taxes are being increased because the board has
knuckled under to the demands of those "long-haired, irreverent young
kids" teaching in the local school system. In a state such as Ohio, where
school taxes cannot be increased without the affirmative vote of the tax-
payers, the sledding is even tougher. A school board which finds it has
negotiated a contract which it can't afford, and then finds its proposed tax
levy defeated by the voters, is in a very difficult bind. It must then hope
that the state legislature will pass some sort of emergency legislation which
will, once again, bail out the state's bankrupt school districts, or that some
boon will be forthcoming from the federal government. Even if the
Supreme Court should decide in Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent
School District1 that the present system of financing local school districts
primarily through local property taxes must be revamped to provide equal-
ity of educational opportunity throughout a state, the basic problem facing
the school negotiator will remain-he will still be required to attempt to
meet the financial demands made by the teachers from a limited financial
source.
Assuming there is some money available, how do you negotiate a
1337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Texas 1971), prob. jurs. noted 40 U.S.L.W. 2398 (U.S. April
4, 1972) (No. 71-1332).
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school contract? Let's follow the procedure from the designation of
the appropriate bargaining unit to the completed contract. Twenty-nine
states have statutes governing bargaining with public employees. Most
of these have established a procedure for the certification of a bargain-
ing unit and, by some definition or another, they exclude supervisors from
the teacher bargaining unit. Whether under a statutory scheme or, as in
Ohio, in the absence of a statute, I believe the single most important unit
question for school boards is the status of the principal. In my view, it is
mandatory that the principal not be a member of the teacher bargaining
unit. The principal is the first line supervisor in the school, and he is the
representative of the school board and superintendent in dealing with the
teaching staff. He cannot be compromised in his role by being a member of
the teachers' bargaining unit. Many principals are confused as to their
status because of their closeness to the teaching staff, and because of their
traditional membership in teacher organizations such as the NEA. Some
school systems, early in the trend toward negotiated teacher contracts, al-
lowed their principals to be members of the teacher bargaining units. I'm
sure they have lived to regret that decision. I cannot imagine the schools
being properly administered where the principal is in the same union as his
staff. The handling of teacher grievances alone would be a mess under
such a system. Since 80 to 90 percent of all grievances involve a decision
of the immediate supervisor of the grievant, how could a principal defend
his own decision, which provoked the grievance, and then enforce the con-
tract against a fellow bargaining unit member? Such an arrangement is
dearly untenable.
As far as other staff members are concerned, I think their inclusion or
exclusion should depend upon their actual role as supervisors. Department
leaders and curriculum leaders, if they really do supervise teachers and im-
plement board policy, should probably be excluded. School nurses are
ordinarily included in the teacher unit but may have a separate salary sched-
ule. Teacher aides are non-professionals and yet they work very closely
with the teachers. In most cases, they are not included in the teacher unit.
In Ohio, they are usually represented, with the other non-teaching employ-
ees, by the Ohio Association of Public School Employees (hereinafter
OAPSE). In some areas, these employees are members of the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (hereinafter
AFSCME). Since the number of aides employed and their utilization are
matters which directly affect the teachers' working conditions, the teachers
would like to bargain about the aides. Obviously, where the aides are rep-
resented in a separate bargaining unit this causes some confusion. Three
years ago in Columbus it was necessary to reduce the number of aides by
some 200 positions in order to recoup $500,000 per year to fund the con-
tract that had been negotiated. Since the non-teaching employees felt that
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the lion's share of the negotiated increases had gone to the teachers, they
resented this depletion of their ranks in order to fund those increases.
OAPSE brought suit and it reached the Ohio Supreme Court before the
cuts were finally held to be legal.
School secretaries usually fall in the same category as other non-profes-
sional employees and are not included in the teacher bargaining unit.
Coaches, since they are teachers, are included in the teacher bargaining
unit, but I find they very often constitute a splinter group within the unit.
Since their demands for increased extra-curricular pay take away from the
funds available for the rest of the staff in salary increases, there is some-
times a noticeable pulling and tugging on the teachers' bargaining team
when the subject of coaches' salaries is raised. In fact, the coaches will
often send a representative of their group into the bargaining sessions, even
though he is not a regular member of the teachers' bargaining team. They
are usually quite muscular, forceful young men, and I have never seen any
successful resistance by the other members of the teachers' group to this
intrusion.
Bus drivers, janitors, cafeteria employees and maintenance men are usu-
ally represented by OAPSE or AFSCME in bargaining units separate
from the teachers. As with any situation involving multiple bargaining
units, each unit claims the other is being favored in the negotiations and is
receiving too great a slice of the pie. When the contracts with the teachers
and non-teaching employees are being negotiated at the same time, as they
usually are, the school board negotiator has the additional task of trying to
assure both groups that they are receiving an equitable portion of the avail-
able funds. He must also avoid being whip-sawed by pre-arranged com-
plementary demands, particularly in the area of fringe benefits, The "You
get the life insurance increase while we get the hospitalization increase,
baby" approach by the two groups can put a school board negotiator in a
very awkward bind. Each group will, of course, be willing to provide the
board's negotiator with reams of statistical data as to why their group is
woefully underpaid, and with cogent reasons as to why the available funds
should go to "us" and not to "them." This competition for the available
buck is but another factor in making the school board negotiator's job a
garden of delight.
Once the bargaining unit is decided upon, the main event begins. If
you have never been involved in a school negotiation, you will probably be
amazed at the degree of formality and feverish attention to ritual which
are espoused by both the teachers' negotiators, particularly if they are the
local teachers, and by the school board and administrators. I attribute this
to the fact that both groups have attended seminars put on by the educa-
tion associations, school board associations and administrators associations,
at which people who have never negotiated a labor agreement tell them
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how to negotiate one. From these sessions they return with their heads
filled with such sugar plums as:
"If the school board has five members on its bargaining team, then the
teachers can only have five."
"No item may be discussed during a negotiating session unless it is set
forth on a written agenda previously agreed to by the respective chairmen
of the negotiating teams."
"There may be a limited number of observers for each side in addition
to the team members, but such observers may not speak while in the meet-
ing."
"All items agreed to must be reduced to writing, initialled by the cap-
tains of the respective teams, and then approved by some governing com-
mittee which meets somewhere else and which does not know what went on
at the negotiating table."
Needless to say, this insistence on a Kabuki-type of formalized negoti-
ating, plus the school boards' traditional insistence that negotiations pro-
ceed only after the close of the school day, makes for very slow progress
in the initial stages. It is only when the negotiators are able to strip off
the straitjacket of these inhibiting rituals, roll up their sleeves and really
address themselves to the issues at hand that any substantial progress
occurs.
Who should do the negotiating for the school district? What should
be the make-up of the school board's, if you'll pardon the expression,
"team?" I believe a school board is best represented by a professional ne-
gotiator and preferably an attorney. I say this not merely as an exercise in
enlightened self-interest, but because I sincerely believe it. The negotiat-
ing process in the public sector requires someone with the same peculiar
temperament and qualifications to make it work that are required in the pri-
vate sector. As Mayor Rizzo said, it is no role for an amateur. I believe
a negotiator with experience in the private sector can more successfully
make the transition to public sector bargaining, and achieve a better result,
than can the amateur with no background in labor relations who assays the
role of negotiator after attending one or more seminars in bargaining.
Some school districts have used their school solicitors as their negotia-
tors on the theory, presumably, that since they are lawyers, they are quali-
fied to negotiate contracts. In my opinion, the average school solicitor can
be of great assistance to the board's negotiator, but, unless he has had pre-
vious collective bargaining experience, he should not be the board's nego-
tiator. The school solicitor can be of great assistance in interpreting the
many statutes which relate to school finance and school personnel policies,
and which provide legal inhibitions in many of the areas to be negotiated.
The school solicitor's background in this specialized area of the law is in-
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valuable in steering the board's negotiator away from pitfalls into which his
experience in the private sector might lead him. For example, I decided on
one occasion that a demand that the board pay the difference between a
teacher's military pay and his regular teaching salary while he was serving
on temporary active duty with the National Guard was perfectly reasonable,
only to be reminded that, under the applicable statute, a public employee
could only be paid such monetary difference for a maximum of 15 days and
that, therefore, the proposal was illegal. This is the type of item where an
experienced school solicitor, with his background in the varied and peculiar
statutory provisions relating to school employees, can be of immense assis-
tance to the negotiator. But he should not be at the bargaining table.
It is also my firm opinion that members of the board of education should
not be at the bargaining table. These wonderful people, who give so much
of themselves without pay and normally at the price of an unbelievable
amount of criticism and abuse from the people they best serve, just are
not qualified to be bargainers. They normally have no background to qual-
ify them. In addition, they are too emotionally involved in their school
systems to make the objective and dispassionate decisions which are the
stock in trade of a professional negotiator. As political figures, they are
too sensitive to the heat which a clever group of school teachers can place
upon them at the table to make the tough decisions which have to be made,
or to agree to the compromises which are necessary to make a negotiation
succeed. They are too much in the role of the corporate president who
should be saved from emotional involvement in the rough-and-tumble of
negotiations and withheld for the final, dispassionate decisions which mean
the difference between success and failure in negotiating. Unfortunately,
many school board members feel negotiations cannot be successfully com-
pleted without their personal involvement; since they fear public criticism
if they do not exhibit their personal concern in this vital area. I would
advise you to firmly state that board members should not be direct parties
to the negotiations, and, if your advice is not taken in this regard, I would
suggest you withdraw from the situation. While the board, as your client,
must be kept advised as to the progress of negotiations, it is my opinion
that a board member at the bargaining table is too vulnerable and will
tend to destroy your effectiveness as chief negotiator. Keep them in that
mysterious back room of ultimate decisions and they can serve you very
effectively.
I feel the same way about the superintendent of schools. While he
should be your chief source of direction as to the management and pro-
cedural provisions which should be included in the contract, he should not
be at the bargaining table. He again, as the board members, brings too
heavy an emotional charge to the negotiating atmosphere. Superintendents
have a tendency to strike the pose of the autocratic despot-"I say it's so
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and therefore it is, by God"--or the benevolent despot-"Take care of my
people, they're good folks". Either pose at the bargaining table can be a
real obstacle to a reasonable and proper bargain. He is better kept in the
back room as a wise and powerful friend to the chief negotiator and a buf-
fer with the board.
Principals can also be an excellent source of information, and their ad-
vice should be sought concerning those items which deal with the daily
operation of the schools. After all, they will be the people primarily re-
sponsible for making the contract work. If you harness them with un-
workable or unduly restrictive contract provisions, they will just not be able
to do an effective job of managing their schools. However, I do not believe
they should be at the bargaining table, at least, not until you are sure that
they have resolved in their minds that they are part of management.
Among those who should also not be parties to the negotiation process are
mayors, city councilmen, judges and newspaper reporters. The extent to
which any or all of these well-meaning but unqualified souls get themselves
involved in school negotiations is the measure of the failure of the negotiat-
ing process.
Who should be involved in the negotiations for the school board in
addition to the chief negotiator? My suggestion is that what you need
with you at the table is a school administrator with a strong background in
the educational and financial problems of the district. If there is no one
person who can cover both areas, take two administrators in with you. If
they can speak well and keep from giving the place away to the teachers,
let them talk at the table. If not, have them feed you the information and
keep extremely quiet at the table themselves. While I don't believe edu-
cators should make the mistake of fancying themselves as negotiators, I
don't think a negotiator, unless he's had an awful lot of experience in the
field, and perhaps not even then, should make the mistake of fancying him-
self as an educator. The intricacies and histories of school districts are too
disparate for any negotiator to walk in and assume the mantel of expert.
A really sharp administrator who has a teaching background and some un-
derstanding of the financing and workings of the school district can be of
inestimable value to the school board's negotiator. I have always had
such a person at my disposal in school negotiations and I wish you similar
good fortune.
In order to guard against a gap between what the administrators say
should happen to their school system and what the school board might
want for their school system, I would suggest regular reports to the school
board concerning the progress of negotiations, either directly or through a
liaison committee of board members. Obviously, such reports should not be
made at public meetings of the board.
Once you have selected your team, how do you prepare for school ne-
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gotiations? The first thing to do, of course, is to have an analysis made of
comparable school districts. What do their salary schedules look like, what
fringe benefits do they offer, what types of leaves do they give, and what
does their extracurricular pay schedule look like? Have this charted and
also chart their tax rates and revenues and dollars of "effort" per pupil.
Next, take a good, hard look at the school district's budget. Have it ex-
plained to you by a school administrator who really understands it. Ask
searching questions concerning the projections of revenue and expendi-
tures. Test the answers against previous years. If there are changes or
discrepancies, find out why. If there is water in the budget, find out where
it is and why it is. You cannot speak with assurance to the teachers' nego-
tiators concerning the scarcity of funds for salary increases unless you are
assured that there is, in fact, a scarcity and not just a smoke-screen for
some pet project of the board or superintendent.
Next, have someone cost-out the economic proposals of the teachers.
If you are involved in a first negotiation you may be very surprised and
perhaps appalled at the teachers' lack of knowledge of the cost of their
salary schedule and their fringe benefits. Since most school systems are on
a single track salary schedule (in Ohio it is required by statute), the best
way to cost a salary proposal is to establish a "staff profile." This is simply
a chart showing where the teachers in the system are in terms of degrees and
years of experience as of a certain date, and how many teachers are at each
salary level. If the parties can agree on a profile which both will use in
costing-out salary proposals, one area of confusion in your negotiations
can be resolved. Teacher salary schedules are made up of degree achieve-
ment-Bachelors; Bachelors plus a number of graduate credits; Masters;
Masters plus a number of graduate credits; and Ph.D.-and years of teach-
ing. They set up a system of progression with an incremental increase
per year up to an established maximum. Teachers, unlike other em-
ployees who must negotiate any increase which they achieve, have a
built-in annual increase based on longevity and only negotiate whatever
increase they will get above this increment by changes in the salary sched-
ule. A school board, therefore, is faced each year with increased salary
costs, even in the absence of a negotiated increase, and must make allow-
ance for such increase before negotiating. In order to cost-out the salary
proposal of the teachers, it is necessary to assume that the staff make-up
for the projected contract year will be approximately the same as the staff
on a date certain in the negotiation year and to project all salary data on
that basis. By doing this, it is possible to chart, with a fair degree of ac-
curacy, the cost of any salary proposal made by the teachers. Increases in
starting salaries, changes in increments and decreases in the number of
years to maximum in any degree category, can be applied to the staff pro-
file and a fairly accurate appraisal of their costs in the contract year can be
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established. Absent this device, the cost calculation can become a hope-
less muddle.
The costs of fringe benefits are calculated in school negotiations as in
any other negotiation. Contributions to hospital and surgical insurance, the
purchase of life insurance, and contributions to school retirement systems
are at established rates and should be easily calculated.
One of the deceptive cost areas for the uninitiated bargainer is the
concept of reduced class size. Everyone is attracted by the idea of Johnny
being in a class of smaller size so that, presumably, Miss Smith, his teacher,
will be able to spend more individual attention on his problems. 'Miss
Smith thinks this is a great idea, too, since the fewer Johnnies she has in
her class, the easier the burden on her will be. What is too easily lost
sight of is the tremendous cost implication of reduced class sizes. If you
reduce class size by a contract restriction from 30 to 25, it means that for
each former five classes you must hire another teacher at eight to ten thou-
sand dollars and provide additional classroom space for the new dasses.
The costs of such changes can balloon perilously and eat up an entire
school budget quite quickly. While smaller classes may have an educa-
tional value (although there are arguments pro and con), no one should
be deceived concerning their cost, especially not the board's chief negotia-
tor. Length of the teacher working day, length of the school year and
pay for extra duties are additional cost items which must be dealt with.
Other cost areas which are involved in school negotiations to a much
greater degree than private negotiations concern various leaves of absence.
Teachers are provided by statute with sick leave days. The statutes nor-
mally provide for a minimum number of days which the teachers accrue
each year and the total number which they may accumulate. Anything
above the minimum number of allowable accumulated days is usually sub-
ject to negotiation. Sabbatical leaves are also usually specified by statute
and the minimum conditions and limitations under which they may be
granted are spelled out. Again, the board is usually free to negotiate more
liberal terms with their teachers. Other leaves, such as funeral, personal,
and religious leave days are not usually specified by statute, but are nego-
tiable. The costs of all of these paid leaves are calculated by determining
the cost of hiring substitute teachers to cover for the teachers on leave.
One type of leave which is currently in hot dispute in school negotia-
tions is maternity leave. School boards seem to have a traditional view that
their teachers, even married ones, should not become pregnant and that,
if they do, they should be punished for their folly or carelessness. At one
time, teachers who became pregnant were, in effect, terminated and had to
apply for new employment when they were in shape to do so. This ap-
proach was succeeded by policies which required a teacher to take a leave of
absence-unpaid, of course-at a time when she would not embarrass her
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students by her unfortunate condition, usually the fifth month of preg-
nancy, and would not allow her return to teaching until she had gotten all
of that business cleared up. The regulations of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission relating to treating pregnancy as any other ill-
ness or injury have caused a considerable change in this approach. Most
school boards, however reluctantly, have changed their policies, either
voluntarily or through negotiations, to remove the mandatory departure
and return dates for maternity from their policies, and to allow them to
be treated as medical problems by the teacher and her doctor. What ef-
fect this will have on the boys and girls, heaven only knows. To date, no
one has been bold enough to suggest that maternity leave be converted to
a paid leave and sick leave days be allowed to be used, although I suspect
we are all only one or two lawsuits away from this conclusion.
In the non-economic areas of bargaining, there are many issues peculiar
to a school system which are not found in private negotiations. They re-
late to management rights such as the assignment of teachers to non-teach-
ing duties-supervision of halls, study halls and cafeterias; the requirement
that teachers attend after-school events such as PTA. meetings; the right or
non-right of teachers to leave the school building during non-duty periods;
and similar ground rules which generally establish the relationship between
the teacher and his principal. It is also possible to become involved in
heated discussions concerning personal and academic freedom of teachers,
evaluation of teachers' performance and the handling of disruptive stu-
dents.
One of the big issues in teacher negotiations is the establishment of a
grievance and arbitration system. Once the negotiator can convince his
client that grievance and arbitration procedures are not un-American and
do not constitute an illegal delegation of legislative authority to some wild-
eyed liberal stranger, the negotiated result sounds pretty much like any other
grievance procedure in the private sector. In my experience, once every-
one gets over their awe or fear of the procedure, it works nearly as it does
in the private sector and provides a means of problem-solving without open
warfare. Principals and other school administrators have a tendency to be
a little sensitive to criticism by their staffs and, therefore, are not delighted
by the idea of teachers having the right to grieve their conduct. However,
they usually adjust to it just about the time the teachers get over filing
grievances for any and all reasons, just for the sheer joy of it. In Pennsyl-
vania, the statute covering negotiations with public employees requires that
the contract contain a provision for binding arbitration of grievances.
Assuming you have some money available, you are able to cut a deal on
the salaries and fringes, and you reach agreement on maternity leave and
a grievance procedure, all you have to do is write your contract in fairly
comprehensible language, get it signed and ratified and sit back for the
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next time. But suppose, heaven forbid, the generosity of your offers and
the force of your personality have not overwhelmed the teachers and you
find yourself at impasse; what happens now? Of the 29 states having public
employee bargaining acts, only two, Hawaii and Pennsylvania, specifically
recognize the right of public employees to strike; and Pennsylvania hedges
this right with mediation and fact-finding procedures before the right to
strike comes to fruition. Other state statutes range from Ohio, with its
stringent Ferguson Act, which forbids strikes by public employees and es-
tablishes severe penalties for its violation, to New York's Taylor Act, which
provides machinery for preventing strikes, but also penalties if they occur.
Whatever the statutory procedure or lack of it, strikes by teachers do
occur, and they occur with very serious consequences to the students
and their parents. I firmly believe school teachers should not have the
right to strike. Unlike Theodore Kheel, Mayor Lindsay's expert for all
seasons, I don't think the right to strike is the sine qua non for effective
bargaining in the public sector. I don't find the right to strike in the
Bible or the Constitution or engraved on any stone tablets. I think ef-
fective bargaining can take place without it. I think Pennsylvania wishes
it had never had the bright idea of handing the right to strike to its teach-
ers, because they have certainly seized upon it and made a shambles of ne-
gotiations, as in the Philadelphia situation. A school system cannot really
tolerate a strike, and its taxpayers should not be required to bear the bur-
den, financially or emotionally, of a strike which deprives their children of
the education which they are being called upon to finance.
What are the alternatives? The critics of punitive statutes such as the
Ferguson Act say that they are so harsh that the courts will not enforce
them and, therefore, they become meaningless. (Parenthetically, let me
say that several years ago there was a movement in some quarters to
strengthen the Ferguson Act. My reaction at that time was that the only
way it could be strengthened would be to provide capital punishment for
violations of it.) In any event, it is valid criticism to say that merely pro-
scribing strikes by school employees without providing a procedure by
which their legitimate demands might be met in the absence of a strike is
short-sighted and punitive. On the other hand, it appears that some en-
forceable restriction on strikes is required. It must be observed that the
New York teachers, who have access to the procedures of the Taylor Act
and who are also subject to the punitive provisions of that Act, have seen
fit to settle their differences with the board of education without a strike
ever since Mr. Shanker spent some time in the local lockup and the orga-
nization got socked substantially in its pocketbook.
What is a proper procedure for settling an impasse in public bargain-
ing? It seems to me that mediation is certainly appropriate. While it
doesn't guarantee settlement, the intervention of a skilled mediator may
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certainly assist the parties in many instances to focus on the issues and find
solutions to them. How about fact-finding? This procedure is quite pop-
ular in public negotiations. It consists simply of each side presenting their
positions and arguments to a panel of outsiders, preferably prominent citi-
zens in the community, who have an interest in the educational system and
who will make recommendations for solutions of the issues in dispute.
While this device can also be helpful in resolving the problems involved,
the recommendations of the fact-finders are not binding and may be ignored
by either or both parties. The third alternative to an unwanted strike is
binding arbitration. While there are dozens of reasons, some valid and
some fallacious, put forth by the opponents of interest arbitration, I be-
lieve it is the only "viable altemative"-as my jargon friends would describe
it-to a strike. Whatever its shortcomings, it is the only method by which
the conflicting views of the parties can be tested before an objective tri-
bunal and a result reached which will be binding on both parties. If the
parties have valid reasons for their positions and financial data to support
them, they should have no fear of exposing those positions to a tribunal
which will fashion a solution, properly recognizing the valid interests of
the teachers, the administrators, the school board, the students and the tax-
payers, without the necessity of a strike destructive of the best interests
of all of the groups involved. If we do not move in this direction, I am
afraid the Philadelphia fiasco and others similar to it will become the rule
and not the regrettable exception in school bargaining.
Faced with the absence of a statutory procedure in Ohio, I established in
1969, through bargaining with the Columbus Education Association, a
three-step procedure involving negotiation, fact-finding, and, as a last alter-
native, binding arbitration. The result was a contract fair to both sides.
I believe that the existence of binding arbitration, coupled with an effec-
tive inhibition against strikes, will encourage effective collective bargain-
ing rather than inhibiting it. Although we were criticized in some quarters
for committing the school board to the possibility of binding arbitration,
I feel its availability has been a major factor in Columbus' ability to se-
cure equitable contract agreements with its teachers while remaining the
only major school district in Ohio which has not had a teachers' strike. I
would recommend it as an approach to be used in the absence of a statu-
tory procedure, and I would recommend its consideration by the Ohio leg-
islature if they ever seriously address themselves to formulating legislation
in this area.
In conclusion, although I may have made some statements critical of
all of the parties involved in school negotiations, I have done so primarily
to exaggerate and dramatize the problems inherent in school bargaining.
In truth, I am constantly amazed at the dedication and sense of mission
which all of the people involved in the educational process possess. The
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members of the school board with whom I have worked, whatever their
backgrounds, have expended overwhelming amounts of time and energy,
without pay and under almost constant criticism, to insure the children of
their school districts the best education possible. Similarly, the adminis-
trators with whom I have been fortunate enough to work have spent un-
told hours in what has to be a labor of love to make their school system
the best possible. Last but not least are the teachers. Neive, sometimes
arrogant, occasionally aggravating in their presumption of infallibility, the
negotiators for the teacher groups who have faced me across the bargain-
ing table have all convinced me of their sincerity in seeking, through nego-
tiations, a school system and educational program which will, in fact, pro-
vide a "quality education for the boys and girls."
It is rare that a labor negotiator gets the opportunity to deal with prob-
lems which transcend mere dollars and cents. In school negotiations you
will have the opportunity and responsibility of acting as the trustee of pub-
lic funds, the challenge of dealing with extremely diverse interests in highly
complicated financial and managerial problems, and the hope that, even in
some small way, you have made a contribution to one of the most impor-
tant endeavors of our nation-the education of its youth. If the oppor-
tunity is presented to you, I hope you will seize upon it and bring to it all
of your skills and abilities as a lawyer and professional negotiator.*
* [Ed. note]. In turning down the recommendations of a state appointed factfioder, the
Philadelphia teachers went on strike on January 8, 1973. As of press date the strike is still un-
resolved.
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